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Products Liability of Successor Corporations:
A Policy Analysis
When a corporate acquisition is structured as an acquisition of assets
rather than as a merger, consolidation, or stock purchase,' the traditional
corporate law rule is that the acquiring corporation (the "successor") is not
liable for the debts and liabilities of the acquired corporation (the
"predecessor").2 The successor corporation is liable, however, if the asset
acquisition comes within one of four generally accepted exceptions: there
was an express or implied agreement to assume the liabilities;3 the trans-
action sufficiently resembled a merger to be considered a de facto merger;
the successor was sufficiently similar to the predecessor to be considered
a mere continuation of the latter;5 or the transaction was fraudulent.6 For
corporate planners, the ability to structure a corporate acquisition as an
asset acquisition, thus avoiding liability, is an obvious benefit of this tradi-
tional rule. For products liability plaintiffs, however, the traditional rule
is an undesirable obstacle to the recovery of compensation for their injuries.
If the corporation that manufactured the injury-causing product no longer
exists, having liquidated after selling its assets to another corporation, the
plaintiff may be unable to recover at all unless he can recover from the
successor corporation.7 The traditional rule is likely to prevent such
recovery.8
Recent courts have ventured beyond the traditional rule of successor
nonliability to allow products liability plaintiffs to recover against successor
corporations for injuries caused by products manufactured by their
I If the acquisition is a merger or consolidation, the acquiring corporation may be required
to assume the liabilities of the acquired corporation by the merger or consolidation statute,
e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT SS 65-70 (rev. ed. 1976), or under case law, see cases cited
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 5 7121 n.1 (1973). If the acquisi-
tion is structured as a stock purchase, the acquiring corporation becomes responsible for
the liabilities of the acquired corporation only to the extent of its ownership interest. Com-
ment, Successor Liability in Corporate Acquisitions-An Examination of Attempts to Limit
the Use of the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 46 J. Am L. & COMMERCE 483, 485 (1981).
2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS S 7122 n.1 (1973), provides
a comprehensive list of cases applying this rule.
3Id
Id. For a discussion of the de facto merger doctrine, see 1.6 D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLAN-
NING, 697-723 (1966).
1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (1973).
'Id.
For a discussion of the difficulties a products liability plaintiff faces in attempting to
recover from a dissolved corporation, see infra note 64.
1 E.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 0D. Colo. 1968); McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 228 A.2d 585 (1972).
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predecessors. Several courts have allowed recovery by expanding the de
facto merger 9 and mere continuation exceptions." In 1977 the Supreme
Court of California abandoned the traditional rule and its exceptions and
created a new rule referred to as the "product-line rule."" The product-
line rule has been adopted by some jurisdictions12 and rejected by others. 3
This note will evaluate the expansion of successor products liability in
the context of asset acquisitions, focusing on the policy rationales of the
traditional rule and those of strict products liability. Following a brief
discussion of some important recent cases, these policy rationales will be
examined to determine the extent to which they support each of several
alternative solutions to the successor liability issue.
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CASES
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 4 the Michigan Supreme Court
adopted a rule of successor liability based on continuity of the enterprise.1
In Turner, the plaintiff was injured by a power press manufactured by the
defendant corporation's predecessor. The successor acquired the
predecessor's assets with cash and continued to manufacture the same pro-
duct under the same name, using the predecessor's physical plant and
management. The successor defendant argued that it was protected by the
traditional corporate rule of nonliability because the transaction did not
come within the de facto merger exception; the consideration was cash,
rather than stock in the successor corporation. 6
The Michigan court rejected the defendant's argument, reasoning that
it was illogical that a successor corporation's liability for its predecessor's
products depended on whether the acquisition was for cash or stock.17 By
eliminating the requirement that the successor corporation's stock be used
as consideration in the transfer of assets, the court in Turner expanded
the de facto merger exception. 8 This departure from the traditional de facto
I E.g., Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), discussed
infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. Cf. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp.
797, 800-01 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (more traditional interpretation of de facto merger exception).
, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). Cf. McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555,563,264 A.2d 98,106 (1970) (traditional interpretations of mere continuation
exception).
" Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977), discussed infra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
" See case cited infra note 34.
"S See cases cited infra note 35.
" 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
15 Id. at 410, 244 N.W.2d at 875.
16 This was the only aspect of the Turner transaction that prevented it from fitting the
traditional de facto merger exception. For a statement of the other requirements of a de
facto merger, see infra note 18.
17 See Turner, 397 Mich. at 421-22, 244 N.W.2d at 879-80.
" See id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883. The court retained the other three elements of a de
facto merger:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that
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merger exception was justified by policies of strict products liability. 9
In Ray v. Alad Corp.,20 the Supreme Court of California expanded suc-
cessor liability by creating a new exception to the traditional rule of
nonliability, rather than by expanding the scope of one of the existing ex-
ceptions. The relevant facts in Alad were the same as those in Turner.1
The California court upheld the successor corporation's liability under a
new exception to the traditional rule: the "product-line rule." Under this
rule a successor corporation is liable for injuries caused by its predecessor's
product lines that the successor continues to manufacture.' The Califor-
nia court enumerated three justifications for the product-line rule: the plain-
tiff had virtually no chance of recovering from the predecessor; the suc-
cessor had virtually the same ability as the predecessor to estimate the
risks of product liability claims, to insure against them, and to pass on the
costs of insurance or damages paid to purchasers of the product; and since
the successor enjoys the benefits of the predecessor's goodwill, fairness
requires that he should bear the burden of product claims as a necessary
incident to the benefits from the goodwill.'
Although the courts in both Turner and Alad found successors liable for
their predecessors' products under similar factual situations, they adopted
there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations....
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves when legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
operations of the seller corporation.
Id. at 420, 244 N.W.2d at 879 (quoting Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797,
801 (WJ). Mich. 1974)).
19 The court reasoned that the traditional rule had developed to protect creditors and
shareholders rather than products liability plaintiffs, and was "not applicable to meeting the
substantially different problems associated with products liability." Citing Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (st Cir. 1974), the court in Turner based successor liability on the suc-
cessor's superiority over the consumer in calculating the risk of defects, insuring against
the cost of product-related injuries, and improving product quality. 309 Mich. at 425,244 N.W.2d
at 881. The court further supported successor liability with an estoppel theory: a successor
corporation that represents itself as the same company as its predecessor should be estop-
ped from denying that it is in fact the same company when a claim based on a product manufac-
tured by the predecessor arises. Id. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882. The Turner court dismissed
the defendant's contention that the new rule would have an adverse economic impact on cor-
porate transactions, stating that "once corporations considering such transactions become
aware of the possibility of successor products liability, they can make suitable preparations."
Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
21 The predecessor dissolved soon after the transaction, the consideration was cash, the
manufacturing operation continued unchanged, and the same corporate and trade names were
used. Id. at 26-27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
I& at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. The court in Alad also noted that
the product-line rule would prevent the predecessor from realizing a windfall by selling its
business at a price higher than its true value. It would also prevent the predecessor from
avoiding responsibility for injuries caused by its defective products, because the predecessor
would pay for them through a reduction in the price for which it could sell its assets. Id at
34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
19831
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
different rules. The Turner rule emphasizes "continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations,"2 '
whereas the Alad rule emphasizes product line continuity." In Ramirez v.
Amsted Industries," the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the Alad
product-line rule, emphasizing the difference between the Turner rule and
the Alad ruleY Although the New Jersey court found that the defendant
successor corporation could be held liable under either rule, it chose to adopt
the Alad rule, because such an approach totally abandoned the traditional
corporate rule and was based entirely on strict liability policy.'
In Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey
extended the product-line rule to a different factual situation. Nieves in-
volved two defendants, Harris Corporation and Bruno-Sherman Corpora-
tion. A defective power press injured the plaintiff in 1975. The manufac-
turer of the defective press sold all its assets to defendant Harris in 1964.
Harris continued the product line until it sold the assets related to this
product line in 1972 to Bruno-Sherman, which continued the power press
line. Harris remained a viable corporation, continuing to manufacture
another product line." The New Jersey court upheld Harris Corporation's
liability, reasoning that the product-line rule supported the liability of an
intermediate successor corporation which neither made the specific defec-
tive product at issue nor was manufacturing the same product line at the
time of the injury. 1 The court also recognized the possibility of another
2, Turner, 397 Mich. at 420, 244 N.W.2d at 879.
The Alad opinion does not clearly define the court's rule. It states that a successor which
continues the product line "under the circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liabil-
ity for defects in units of the same product line." 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal.
Rptr. at 582 (emphasis added). Thus, the Alad rule can be narrowly construed as requiring
all the Turner continuity factors, as well as product line continuity, as all these factors were
present in the circumstances of Alad. The Alad rule, however, has generally been construed
more broadly as requiring product line continuity without requiring the other Turner con-
tinuity factors. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). But see
Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 182-85 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (successor
must also "hold itself out as the same manufacturing enterprise"); Rawlings v. Oliver, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 890, 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 120 (1979) (successor liable although it did not continue
identical product line).
86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
The New Jersey court adopted the broader of the two possible interpretations of the
product-line rule discussed supra note 25. According to the court in Ramirez, the Turner
rule focuses on continuity of the corporate entity, while the Alad rule "is concerned not with
the continuation of the corporate entity as such but rather with the successor's undertaking
to manufacture essentially the same line of products as the predecessor." Id. at 347, 431 A.2d
at 819.
' The court in Ramirez used the same three strict liability policy factors as the Alad court.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 828-29.
Id. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828. According to the court, this result was justified because
of Harris' role in the destruction of the plaintiff's remedy against the original manufacturer
and because Harris was "an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise
that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products." Id. at 371, 431 A.2d
[Vol. 58:677
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theory of successor liability, based on a duty to warn owners of a product's
known defects.2
Several other federal and state courts have expanded successor liabil-
ity following either the Turner continuation rule' or the Alad product-line
rule.- The trend toward expanded successor liability has not been univer-
sal, however, as a number of state and federal courts have refused to adopt
the Alad product-line rule.'5 Other courts have upheld the traditional rule
of nonliability by refusing to adopt the Turner rule or other expansions
of the continuation and de facto merger exceptions.3 1
Courts cite several reasons for being reluctant to expand successor liabil-
ity. First, questions concerning the social and economic effects of such ex-
pansion are better suited to legislative investigation, rather than to case-
by-case judicial determination.3 7 Second, while strict liability is liability
without negligence, it is not liability without some responsibility for the
plaintiff's injury.38 This responsibility is usually based on the defendant's
participation in placing the product in the stream of commerce.3 ' Holding
a successor liable for harm caused by its predecessor's products would
violate this basic principle of strict liability as well as common notions of
justice and fairness since the successor had nothing to do with the place-
ment of the product into the stream of commerce.' In Domine v. Fulton
at 831 (quoting Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582, quoting
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899
(1964)).
= 86 N.J. at 372, 431 A.2d at 832-33. The court did not actually find liability on this theory.
It suggested this possibility and remanded for further development of facts relevant to this
theory.
E.g., Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chems., 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (applying Ohio
law).
E.g., Daweiko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
E.g., Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law);
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana law); Leannais v. Cin-
cinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Wisconsin law); Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D.
447 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (applying Ohio law); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 394 So. 2d 552 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979).
- E.g., Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc, 463 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J. 1976); Nguyen v.
Johnson Mach. & Press, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E2d 1104 (1982). The results in these
federal diversity cases and those in supra note 35 may have been influenced by the reluc-
tance of the courts to anticipate changes in state law in the absence of any indication that
the courts of that state would be inclined to expand successor liability. See, e.g., Leannais,
565 F.2d at 441 ("a Federal Court should not impose the policy pronouncements of the Supreme
Court of one state upon the citizens of another").
I Leannais, 565 F.2d at 441; Turner, 397 Mich. at 453, 244 N.W.2d at 894 (Coleman, J.,
dissenting). These questions include "[w]hether the mounting costs of such change can be
absorbed by insurance, whether product liability costs may grow so high in one state as to
encourage business emigration, [and] whether the relationship of workmen's compensation
laws to products liability laws should be adjusted." Leannais, 565 F.2d at 440 n.7.
Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
3' Domine, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
See Leannais, 565 F.2d at 441 n.8; Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 820.
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Iron Works,4' the Appellate Court of Illinois justified its refusal to expand
successor liability by referring to two strict liability policies not mentioned
in Alad: the implied representation of product safety and the improvement
of product safety. The Illinois court reasoned that the successor corpora-
tion made no representation concerning the safety of its predecessor's pro-
ducts and was unable to improve their safety. Consequently, the successor
should not have been liable for the harm the product caused.4 Some courts
which have refused to expand successor liability stated in dictum, however,
that in certain situations it may be appropriate to hold successors liable
for the breach of a duty to warn users of defects in the predecessor's
products.4
3
THE POLICY BASIS OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE OF
SUCCESSOR NONLIABILITY
None of the cases discussed above contains a thorough discussion of the
policy basis for the traditional rule of successor nonliability. Cases that ex-
pand successor liability focus on the plight of the plaintiff and rely upon
strict liability policies supporting successor liability," dismissing the tradi-
tional rule as not relevant to products liability claims.4 5 Cases that do not
expand successor liability factually distinguish cases relied on by plaintiffs
and rebut strict liability policy arguments for successor liability, ignoring
policies that support the traditional rule. 6 Some commentators, however,
have focused on certain policies behind the traditional rule, arriving at dif-
ferent conclusions concerning the significance of these policies in assessing
successor products liability.47
" Domine, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 345 N.E.2d at 23.
42 Id.
" Leannais, 565 F.2d at 441-43; Travis, 565 F.2d at 448-49.
, See, e.g., Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 342, 431 A.2d at 816 (the traditional rule is "inconsistent
with the developing principles of strict products liability and unresponsive to the interests
of persons injured by defective products"); Turner, 397 Mich. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 878
(emphasizing that the plaintiffs problem is the same regardless of the form of the corporate
acquisition).
" In Turner, 397 Mich. at 416, 244 N.W.2d at 877, the Supreme Court of Michigan, refer-
ring to the traditional rule, stated that "products liability law ... has to shake off various
impediments associated with traditional concepts, which, while relevant to other problems,
are inappropriate for this new area."
" See Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 820; Leannais, 565 F.2d at 439-40 and nn.5 & 6. Although
this is the primary focus in these cases, each of them briefly mentions one reason for sup-
porting the traditional rule. 463 F. Supp. at 821 (successor liability burdens business transfers);
565 F.2d at 439 (justice and fairness require that there be no liability for the totally indepen-
dent acts of others). But see Nguyen, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 1147, 433 N.E.2d at 1109 ("[W]e
find it difficult to understand how corporate law can be ignored in making the decision").
" See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV.
86 (1975) (concluding that the traditional rule policies are sufficiently applicable to products
liability claims that the de facto merger exception should not be expanded, and that any ex-




One rationale supporting the traditional rule of nonliability is the pro-
tection of business creditors, which can be accomplished without successor
liability. So long as the predecessor corporation is given adequate considera-
tion for the assets, creditors' interests are sufficiently protected. 8 This ra-
tionale, however, does not support the application of the traditional rule
to products liability claims which often arise long after the dissolution of
the predecessor. Consequently, a products liability plaintiff is much less
likely than a business creditor to benefit from the consideration paid to
the predecessor. 9 Also, a business creditor willingly accepts the risk of
default and can protect himself against it by negotiating for security, per-
sonal guarantees, and a higher interest rate. In contrast, the products liabil-
ity plaintiff is not likely to have considered the possibility of injury, let
alone bargained for protection against the manufacturer's dissolution."
Contract and Tort Principles
Contract law provides the basis for another rationale supporting suc-
cessor's nonliability. Where the plaintiffs claim is contractual, the tradi-
tional rule is supported by the general principle that no one should be bound
a duty to warn theory); Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Pro-
duct Injuries, 27 ME. L. REv. 305,308-11 (1975) (policies behind traditional rule are inappropriate
in products liability cases); Note, Successor Corporations' Products Liability, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1305, 1328-29 (1976) (traditional policy of encouraging marketability of business assets is rele-
vant in products liability cases, but is outweighed by strict liability policy).
" Even if creditors can only partially satisfy their claims out of the consideration, they
are not unfairly prejudiced by being denied an action against the successor, because the risk
that the predecessor would default due to business failure or other events was voluntarily
assumed by the creditor. The traditional rule merely prevents the creditor from gaining a
windfall from the fact that the debtor business sold its assets to a solvent corporation. See
Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co- Liability of Business Transferees for Product Injuries, 27 ME.
L. REv. 305,308-09 (1975). This creditor protection rationale is reflected in the fraud, de facto
merger, and mere continuation exceptions to the traditional rule; because there is a need
for creditor protection in these situations there is successor liability. See Note, Products Liabili-
ty: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 338,351 n.168; Note, Post Dissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Rule of Suc-
cessor Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861,869 (1978).
" Although all states have some statutory provision for post-dissolution lawsuits, these
often have little value to products liability claimants because they only allow such suits dur-
ing a limited time period. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 277 (1975). Once the predecessor
has dissolved and distributed the consideration to its creditors and shareholders, pursuing
the consideration into the hands of the shareholders is not likely to be an effective remedy
for the products liability plaintiff. For a thorough analysis of the difficulties involved in pro-
ducts liability suits against dissolved corporations, see Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy
in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets & Subsequent Dissolution on Product
Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321 (1976); Henn and Alexander, Effect of Corporate
Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 865 (1971).
" See Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Product Injuries,
27 ME. L. REV. 305, 309-10 (1975).
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by an agreement to which he is not a party.51 Applying this rationale to
products liability claims against successors, the traditional rule is limited,
however, by the representation rationale of strict liability, which may justify
successor liability in some situations.5
Where the plaintiff's claim against the predecessor is based on tort law,
a successor's nonliability is supported by the fact that he was not at fault.'
Although strict liability claims are not based on the manufacturer's fault,
they are based on his responsibility for the harm caused by his product.
Consequently, the tort law rationale supporting the traditional rule never-
theless applies to strict liability claims against a successor for the products
of its predecessor, because the successor was not responsible for the harm
caused by the predecessor's product.'
The Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine
A final argument for the traditional rule is that successor nonliability
promotes the free alienability and transferability of corporate assets.
Several commentators"5 have stated that the traditional rule is analogous
to the bona fide purchaser doctrine in real property'6 and commercial law,"7
which protects good faith purchasers from certain claims and liabilities aris-
ing prior to the transactions. Arguably, the bona fide purchaser doctrine
encourages desirable commercial transactions by reducing the risk of loss
See, e.g., id. at 305, 318 n.58.
Contract principles are relevant to the representation rationale for strict liability because
this rationale is related to the implied warranty branch of strict liability, which is "a curious
hybrid ... of tort and contract." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5 95, at 634
(4th ed. 1971). The representation rationale is discussed infra notes 100-07, 119-21 and ac-
companying text.
INote, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Product Injuries, 27
ME. L. REV. 305, 309 (1975).
I This justification for applying the traditional rule to strict liability actions is based on
the premise that strict liability has retained the tort law causation requirement. See infra
notes 92-99 and accompanying text. The tort law rationale for the traditional rule applies
to strict liability claims if this rationale is understood to be based on the lack of a causal
connection between the successor and the plaintiff's injury, rather than simply on the fact
that the successor was not at fault in that he was not negligent.
"E.g., Note, Ray v. Alad Corp.: Imposing Liability on the Successor Corp. for the Defective
Products of the Predecessor Corp., 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 338,356 (1979); Note,Assumption ofPro-
ducts Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 93 (1975).
" See 77 AM. JUR. 2d Vendor and Purchaser S§ 633-725 (1975); J. CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 179 (1962), for the applications of the bona fide purchaser doctrine to
real property transactions.
11 See Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59
B.U.L. REV. 811,813-16 (1979); Gilmore, The CommercialDoctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954), for applications of the bona fide purchaser doctrine to commercial trans-
actions. The Uniform Commercial Code contains many rules based on this doctrine. E.g., U.C.C.
SS 8-205, 8-206, 8-311 (1978) on the rights of a good faith purchaser of a security; and U.C.C.
SS 9-307(1), (2) (1978) on the priority of a buyer in ordinary course over a secured party.
[Vol. 58:677
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to purchasers and allowing them to rely on the apparent good title of the
vendor.'
Although differences exist between a bona fide purchaser situation and
the successor products liability problem, 9 the traditional rule of successor
nonliability, like the bona fide purchaser doctrine, encourages desirable com-
mercial transactions by reducing the buyer's risk of loss.6" This reduces
the buyer's uncertainty concerning the value of the property being pur-
chased, making him more willing to enter into the transaction. Corporate
acquisitions are desirable transactions because they benefit society by in-
creasing economic efficiency and productivity."
Assigning products liability to successors discourages corporate acquisi-
tions because it increases the successor's risk of unanticipated liabilities,
decreasing certainty concerning the value of the predecessor's assets.2 In-
' See Gilmore, supra note 57, at 1057 (the bona fide purchaser is protected so that "com-
mercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate investigation of property rights
and in reliance on the possession of property by one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan").
A second justification for the bona fide purchaser doctrine is that of two innocent parties
with conflicting claims to the property, the loss should fall upon the original owner, who could
have taken greater precautions to protect his interest. See CRIBBETT, supra note 56, at 814.
11 One way in which the typical bona fide purchaser situation differs from the successor
products liability situation is that the latter is more likely than the former to involve claims
arising after the transaction. For this reason the products liability claimant could not have
protected his claim prior to the transaction; it was nonexistent at that time. This distinction
means that the second justification for the bona fide purchaser doctrine, supra note 58, is
not applicable to the successor products liability situation.
I Courts on both sides of the successor products liability issue have recognized this policy.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 25, 560 P.2d 3, 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1977) (the tradi-
tional rule "has the undoubted advantage of promoting the free availability and transferability
of capital"); Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (suc-
cessor liability "greatly burdens business transfers and turns ordinary business transactions
into traps for unwary successor corporations").
"' Most corporate acquisitions are mutually beneficial to the businesses involved, improving
their productivity and profitability, enabling them to meet the demand for their products
better. For example, one reason for selling a business is the need for more working capital,
which another corporation may be able to provide. The buyer may have the capital but need
the technological expertise of the seller. See S. Kinney, Why Companies are for Sale, in COR-
PORATE GROwTH THROUGH MERGER & ACQUISITION 43 (1963). Other reasons for buying or sell-
ing a business include sharing costs of new technology or specialized staff that would other-
wise be unaffordable, and improving or expanding product distribution. See Dettmer, Reasons
for Mergers and Acquisitions, in CORPORATE GROWTH THROUGH MERGER & ACQUISITION 30-35
(1963).
1 There are two distinct sources of uncertainty. First, there is the uncertainty that ex-
ists because the law is in a period of rapid change, making it difficult to predict what the
liability rule will be in the future in any given jurisdiction. This source of uncertainty has
been noted by several commentators. See Hoffman, Products Liability for Successor Corpora-
tions: A Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 369-70; Note, Products Liability-
Corporations-Asset Sales & Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REv. 905,916 (1977). This uncer-
tainty is a problem, but, as the First Circuit pointed out in Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d
1145,1154 (1st Cir. 1974), "this kind of surprise is endemic in a system where legal principles
are applied case by case." This source of uncertainty is temporary and therefore does not
influence the desirability of the various alternative liability rules as such. Second, there is
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surance, however, is a means of spreading risks, substituting a known
premium for an unknown probability of loss. The uncertainty faced by a
prospective purchaser of corporate assets under a successor liability rule
would be minimal if the purchaser could purchase, for a reasonable price,
insurance covering liability for the predecessor's products into the distant
future. The successor would then be able to bargain down the price of the
assets to cover the cost of the insurance. The successor liability rule's ef-
fect of discouraging transactions would be minimized. 3 Unfortunately, the
practical realities of the products liability insurance market make this solu-
tion unrealistic." Consequently, insurance does not adequately perform its
function of reducing uncertainty. Instead of encountering an unknown risk
of liability, the successor corporation is faced with an unknown risk of large
premium increases or the complete unavailability of insurance. Under these
circumstances, a rule of successor liability can be expected to discourage
socially desirable corporate asset acquisitions." This business reality con-
the uncertainty that is inherent in a successor products liability rule; the risk of unpredic-
table liabilities. This type of uncertainty does influence the desirability of various successor
liability rules, because it varies depending on the rule adopted.
I This solution has been mentioned repeatedly, by both courts and commentators. See,
e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974) ("acquiring
corporation will merely arrange for the continuation of the products liability insurance main-
tained by the seller"); Note, Successor Corporations' Products Liability, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1305,
1329 (1976) ("insurance eliminates any objection to the proposed rule on the grounds of un-
predictability ... because the only added cost would be increased premiums commensurate
with the augmented exposure of the carrier").
" As the court in Ray v. Alad Corp. recognized, most products liability insurance policies
are on an "occurrence basis:' covering only injuries that occur during the policy period, rather
than those caused by products manufactured during the policy period, whenever they might
occur. 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (1977); See 3A L. FRUmER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 50.02 (1981). Therefore, the liability for injuries from the
predecessor's products occurring after the acquisition is usually not covered by the
predecessor's insurance. Furthermore the policy period is likely to be quite short, as insurers
"are reluctant to write long-term products liability policies." Note, Corporations: Products
Liability Under the De Facto Merger Doctrine-Knapp v. N. American Rockwell, 49 TEMP.
L.Q. 1014, 1023 (1976. For heavy equipment, such as that involved in most of the successor
liability litigation, the typical policy is for a maximum of two years. Id. At the end of this
period the policy will be reevaluated, and the premium may be increased or the policy may
simply be dropped. Id.
Another problem with products liability insurance is that some businesses are simply unable
to buy insurance, at any price. One survey found that 21.6%M of the businesses seeking pro-
ducts liability insurance could not obtain it. Products Liability Insurance: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Capital Investment and Business Opportunities, of the House Comm. on
SmallBusinesses, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). If the recent past is any indication, premiums
for products liability insurance can be expected to increase significantly for all policyholders.
"The average increase in [products liability] premium costs from 1970 to mid-1977 was 944.6%"
Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations, Protecting the Product User and the Small
Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.D. L.
REV. 1000, 1025 n.93 (1980). Those unfortunate enough to develop major liabilities can expect
that at the end of the policy term, the unavailability and unaffordability problems faced by
all policy holders will be magnified for them as the insurance company adjusts to the increased
risk.
But see Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,428,244 N.W.2d 873,882 (1976),
arguing that since mergers involve successor liability, yet continue to occur, there is no reason
[Vol. 58:677
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
trasts sharply with the prevalent judicial assumptions concerning the ability
of manufacturers to insure against products liability. 8 Therefore, the bona
fide purchaser rationale of the traditional rule supports the application of
the traditional rule to the successor products liability problem.
Alternative Solutions Consistent with the Policies of the Traditional Rule
Commentators have promulgated solutions to the successor liability issue
that are consistent with rationales underlying the traditional rule of
nonliability. One solution takes a legislative approach that expands suc-
cessor liability and takes measures designed to improve the insurance
situation.17 The second solution is judicial extension of the bona fide pur-
chaser analogy. 8 Under this approach the successor would not be liable
if it acquired the predecessor's assets in good faith without notice of the
existence or likelihood of the type of product defect in question. This would
be an objective standard of notice based on what would be revealed by a
reasonable investigation of the predecessor's liability record, quality con-
trol, design safety, and any other available data that might indicate a
likelihood of future claims arising out of a particular type of defect. The
successor would be liable for claims based on defects in the predecessor's
products only if it had notice or should have had notice that such defects
were likely. If, after reasonable investigation, the successor did not find
any likely defects, it would then be able to enter into the transaction with
the certainty that it would be free of liability for the predecessor's products.
This latter solution would provide a better balance between the societal
interest in compensating products liability plaintiffs and society's interest
in encouraging desirable corporate acquisitions. It would prevent corpora-
tions from using acquisitions to avoid predictable liabilities at the expense
of innocent accident victims. It would also reduce the uncertainty of suc-
cessors concerning their potential liabilities for the products of predecessors
which exists under the other rules expanding successor liability. In this
way, it would discourage those transactions which are most likely to leave
to think successor liability will discourage asset acquisitions. The response to this argument
is that because the traditional nonliability rule applies, transactions occur as asset acquisi-
tions that would not occur as mergers because of the uncertainty associated with liability.
These will not occur at all if there is successor liability for asset acquisitions.
See, e.g., Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154 ("hazards of... insuring for risk from defective products
are better borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer"). See also Shannon, 379 F. Supp.
at 802.
" See Note, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-
Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 393-94 (1979), for a discussion of the advantages
of a legislative solution over a judicial solution. See also Note, Products Liability and Suc-
cessor Corporations: Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased
Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 1000, 1025-32 (1980), for sug-
gested legislative reforms of tort and insurance law which would improve the products liability
insurance situation.
' See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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behind many uncompensated victims of the predecessor's products, while
creating a more favorable legal environment for the majority of these trans-
actions which are desirable. Finally, this second solution would be consis-
tent with the tort law rationale of the traditional rule69 because liability
would be tied to the successor's own actions for which it is actually respon-
sible (its investigation of the likelihood of future claims), rather than based
entirely on the independent actions of the predecessor (manufacturing defec-
tive products).
Policies supporting the traditional rule of nonliability suggest that these
different resolutions of the problem are preferable to judicial expansion
of successor liability under the Turner or Alad rules." Corporations may
not be able to adjust to such expanded liability by simply buying insurance
and bargaining down the purchase price of the assets. Successor liability
rules may have a negative economic impact. This potential harm must be
kept in mind and balanced with strict liability policies that supposedly sup-
port expanded successor liability. If these policies strongly support a par-
ticular rule of successor liability, then the benefits of such a rule in terms
of the goals of strict liability may well outweigh its potential negative
economic impact, thus justifying the rule.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY POLICIES AND SUCCESSOR
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Policy Rationales
There is no comprehensive theory of strict products liability that pro-
vides simple and automatic answers to problems involving proposed ex-
tensions of the doctrine to new situations. Rather, there are a number of
different policy rationales that may be used to justify strict liability. In
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,71 the First Circuit listed these rationales: the manufac-
turer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs while the consumer
is helpless; it is the manufacturer that has launched the product into the
channels of trade; it is the manufacturer that has violated the representa-
tion of safety implicit in putting the product into the stream of commerce;
and the manufacturer is the instrumentality to look to for improvement
of the product's quality."
The first rationale was also referred to by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Ray v. Alad Corp.7" The court in Alad stated that manufacturers can
insure against the costs of product-related injuries and spread the cost of
"' See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
"o See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
" 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1154.
'3 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
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insurance to the consuming public as part of the price of their products.7 4
This rationale will be referred to as "cost spreading." The second rationale
emphasizes the manufacturer's active role in causing the injury75 and will
be referred to as "causation" because it is analogous to the tort law re-
quirement of cause-in-fact. The third rationale protects consumer expecta-
tions based on an implied representation of product quality, and will
therefore be referred to as "representation." The fourth rationale involves
the use of strict liability as a financial incentive for product safety improve-
ment. It does this by deterring the production of unsafe products, and will
therefore be referred to as "deterrence" 76
Applying the four rationales to the successor liability problem in Cyr,
the First Circuit reasoned that the successor corporation was liable because
it was in a better position to insure against the risk of defects and to im-
prove the quality of the product. The court conceded, however, that the
successor neither launched the defective product into the stream of com-
merce nor made an implied representation of product quality. 8 Thus,
although successor liability was not supported by the causation or represen-
tation rationales, it was supported by the cost spreading and deterrence
rationales. Such support was sufficient for the court in Cyr to conclude that
successor liability was appropriate.7 1
71 Id. at _ 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at - This is essentially the same idea as
the first rationale from Cyr. v. B. Offen Co. The manufacturer can protect itself through in-
surance and can bear the costs because it can pass them on to consumers.
" Regardless of whether the manufacturer was negligent, it was responsible for causing
the injury. If the manufacturer had not put the defective product into the stream of com-
merce, the plaintiff would not have been injured.
"' Sometimes the deterrence rationale is expressed as a policy that the costs of product
injuries should be treated "as a cost of... doing business, thus assuring that... enterprises
will fully 'pay their way"' in society. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability,
36 VAND. L.REv. 681,685 (1980). As will be discussed infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text,
requiring enterprises to "pay their way" serves the purpose of encouraging all economically
efficient safety improvements. Thus, this policy is functionally equivalent to the deterrence
rationale in that it also furthers the deterrence goal of improving product safety.
I Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
78 Id.
7 Id. The court in Cyr also felt that successor liability was supported by the fact that
the successor was "profiting from ... the accumulated good will which the products have
earned, both in its outward representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to
the same line of equipment" Id. This statement suggests two distinct rationales for successor
liability. The first is that liability for the predecessor's products somehow is justified by the
fact that the successor benefits economically from the predecessor's reputation. A similar
idea is found in the statement in Ray v. Alad Corp. that successor liability "causes the one
'who takes the benefit [to] bear the burden.'" 19 Cal. 3d at - , 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal.
Rptr. at -, (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3521 (West 1970)). This note does not treat this idea
as a distinct strict liability policy rationale both because it is not used to justify strict liability
other than in the successor liability area and because it is a very weak argument for suc-
cessor liability. Although it is certainly true that a successor may benefit economically from
its predecessor's reputation, the cost of this benefit was included in the acquisition price.
See Tift v. Forage King Indus., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 98, 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (1982) (Callow, J., dis-
senting). It is not as if the successor is getting something for nothing if it is not held liable
for the predecessor's products. Furthermore, in addition to the financial burden in the form
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The policy analysis in Cyr illustrates the basic problem involved in ap-
plying strict liability policy to the successor liability issue: whether strict
liability is appropriate when one or more of the four rationales do not sup-
port liability. In the early stages of development of strict products liabil-
ity this was not a problem because all four rationales supported liability
in the cases that gave rise to the doctrine.' In successor liability, as in some
other situations in which expansion of the scope of strict liability has
recently been controverted,8 1 one or more of the rationales do not support
liability. Determining whether strict liability should apply in such situa-
tions requires an inquiry into which combinations of rationales should be
sufficient to justify the imposition of strict liability. Unfortunately, courts
that expand successor liability, like the court in Cyr, have failed to face
squarely this fundamental problem of strict liability policy. These courts
have tended to emphasize the rationales which support liability, while re-
maining silent on the importance of those rationales which do not support
liability.' Several of the courts refusing to expand successor liability,
however, have emphasized the rationales that do not support liability.'
Evaluating the desirability of the various possible solutions to the suc-
cessor liability issue in terms of strict liability policy requires that each
of the four strict liability rationales be examined more closely. For each
rationale, three questions must be considered. The first question concerns
the role that the rationale presently plays in strict liability doctrine. The
second question concerns the importance that should be attached to the
of the purchase price, another burden which necessarily goes with the benefit from the
predecessor's goodwill is the potential that this goodwill may be destroyed if the predecessor's
products prove to be defective and this erodes their reputation. Thus, liability for the
predecessor's products is not a necessary corollary of the proposition that some burden must
be attached to the successor's benefit from the predecessor's goodwill.
The second rationale for successor liability suggested by the above statement from Cyr
is that liability for the predecessor's products is justified by the successor's representation
to the public that it is the same business or produces the same product as the predecessor.
This idea is treated in this note as a variation of the representation rationale, and is discussed
infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
' E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962). In Greenman, the defendant manufacturer was not only able to spread the cost
of the injuries and improve the product quality, but was also the party which launched the
product into the stream of commerce, thereby impliedly representing the product's safety.
" For a discussion of some of these other situations, see Owen, supra note 76, at 703; Hender-
son, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the
Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1081-92 (1980).
' E.g., Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 22, 560 P.2d at 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 574 (emphasizing cost spreading
but not mentioning causation, deterrence, or representation).
E.g, Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 257, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979):
The cornerstone of strict liability rests upon the defendant's active participa-
tion in placing the allegedly defective product into commerce....
The corporate successor ... cannot be said to have created the risk .... has
neither invited use of the product nor represented to the public that the product
is safe ... [and] is not in a position to exert any pressure upon the manufacturer
to enhance the safety of the product.
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rationale in the future development of strict liability doctrine. The third
question concerns the extent to which the rationale supports the various
alternative solutions to the successor products liability issue.
The Present Roles of the Policy Rationales
Under the doctrine of strict liability, cost spreading is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability. It is not necessary
because strict liability doctrine allows an injured consumer to recover from
a manufacturer or merchant as a matter of law, regardless of whether the
manufacturer or merchant is actually in a better position than the injured
consumer to spread the cost of the injury by insuring against the risk of
product-related injury.' It is not sufficient because there are situations in
which the manufacturer is not responsible despite his superior cost-
spreading ability."
Deterrence
The goal of the deterrence rationale in tort law has been defined as
minimizing "the sum of the cost of accidents and the costs of avoiding
accidents."88 Achievement of this goal requires the implementation of all
safety measures which are cost effective, that is, which reduce the costs
of accidents by more than they increase the costs of avoiding accidents. 7
Tort law furthers this goal of deterrence when it places liability for acci-
dent costs on the party that is able to implement safety measures most
cost effectively.'
Although the manufacturer's superior cost-spreading ability may seem self-evident, this
proposition deserves closer scrutiny. In general, products liability insurance is expensive
and can be difficult to obtain, see supra note 66 and accompanying text. Some manufacturers
are small corporations or sole proprietorships with little capacity for risk absorption. Note,
Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 86,90 (1975). In
contrast, many victims of product-related accidents have some capacity for loss spreading
through such means as medical insurance, Medicare, or workmen's compensation. Owen, supra
note 76, at 706.
For example, the manufacturer is not liable if there is no proof that the product was
defective, if an adequate warning was provided, or if the plaintiff assumed a known risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g, j, & n (1965). In each of these situations,
although the manufacturer placed the product into the stream of commerce, its causal role
is remote and insignificant in comparison with other parties, such as the party who failed
to heed the warning or the party who knew of the risk and voluntarily assumed it. The deter-
rence rationale supports liability of other parties: those who played more immediate causal
roles in the accident and hence are in a better position to prevent such accidents. If there
is no defect, then the implied representation of product quality could not have been violated;
the representation is only that the product is not defective, not that it will never cause an
injury. If there is a warning, then the manufacturer's representation was only that the pro-
duct was safe if the warning was heeded.
U G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
See id. at 73-75.
See id. at 135.
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Under present strict liability doctrine, the support of the deterrence ra-
tionale is necessary to the imposition of liability. When an injury is caused
by a product defect that existed when the product left the manufacturer's
control, the manufacturer who is held strictly liable is able to prevent such
injuries in the future by improving the product.89 The manufacturer is not
liable, however, when an injury involving a product is caused not by such
a defect, but by some other factor such as mishandling of the product after
it left the manufacturer's control, unforeseeable misuse of the product by
the plaintiff," or failure of the plaintiff to heed a warning concerning the
product." In these situations, liability of the manufacturer is not supported
by the deterrence rationale because other parties, such as the distributors
or consumers of the product, are able to implement safety measures more
cost effectively. Thus, under present strict liability doctrine, manufacturers
are not held liable for product-related injuries when the deterrence rationale
does not support liability.
Causation
The causation requirement is essentially the tort law requirement of
cause-in-fact. Although the transition from negligence to strict liability in-
volved major changes in traditional tort law doctrine, this basic causation
requirement was retained." Whether phrased in terms of "causation" or
in terms of "responsibility," some causal connection linking the defendant,
the specific product that caused the injury, and the plaintiff is required.
The defendant must be responsible for the plaintiffs injury because it placed
the product which caused the injury in the stream of commerce. If a
manufacturer's product caused the plaintiffs injury, then the manufac-
turer's conduct in producing and selling the product was a causal factor
in the injury, even if other factors were more significant and immediate
causes.' Current strict liability doctrine requires a greater degree of causa-
tion than this in order to hold a manufacturer liable. The injury must have
been caused by the product's defect, and the product must have been defec-
tive at the time it left the defendant's control. 4
Although current strict products liability doctrine sometimes places
liability on a party whose causal role was rather minor or remote, it never
See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 16A[4][e][ii] (1982).
o See id. S 16A[41d].
1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 4:39, at 751 (2d ed. 1974).
See Fegan, Successor Corporations & Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Op-
posing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142,153 (1980) ("strict liability has never meant liability without
responsibility for the defect, but rather was intended to remove the barriers to recovery
between the injured person and the manufacturer of the defective product").
" For example, the defect may have been caused by tampering subsequent to the sale
or the plaintiff may have ignored a warning.
94 PROSSER, supra note 52, at 671-72; RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A(1) (1965).
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places liability on a party who was not a cause-in-fact of the injury at all."5
This is illustrated by the application of strict liability to wholesalers and
retailers of defective products." Often the causal role of a wholesaler or
retailer who is held strictly liable is relatively minor and remote compared
to that of the manufacturer, but it does exist.' The plaintiff still must prove
that his injury was caused by a product defect which existed at the time
the defendant sold the product, 8 and that the defendant sold the particular
product which caused his injury." Thus, under present strict liability doc-
trine, liability is always supported by the causation rationale.
Representation
Under the representation rationale, liability for a product-related injury
is justified when the product fails to conform to the seller's representation
" This causation requirement recently has been challenged in several cases involving so-
called industry-wide or enterprise liability. E.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571,
436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In these cases manufac-
turers were held liable despite the inability of the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants
had manufactured the particular products that had caused their injuries. The plaintiffs were
only able to prove that the defendants had manufactured defective products identical to those
which had injured them. Industry-wide or enterprise liability in such situations is not sup-
ported by the causation rationale because there is no proof of any causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury. Arguably, the result in Bichler was sup-
ported by a form of causation in that the court justified liability with a concerted action theory.
Under this theory, the defendants, along with all other manufacturers of identical products,
had acted together to some extent in developing the product, so that their joint action caus-
ed the plaintiff's injuries by causing the marketing of the defectively designed product by
a large number of manufacturers. See 55 N.Y.2d at 581-86, 436 N.E.2d at 186-89, 540 N.Y.S.2d
at 780-83.
Industry-wide or enterprise liability is not generally accepted as part of strict liability
doctrine and has been criticized for extending the scope of strict liability beyond the usual
causation requirement, see, e.g., Sindel, 26 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 607 P.2d at 938-39,163 Cal. Rptr.
at 146-47 (Richardson, J., dissenting), and beyond the fact of participation in the chain of
manufacture and distribution of the particular product which caused the injury, see, e.g., Note,
Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1001 (1979).
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057
10[c], [d] (1967).
" These parties can be held liable for the sale of a defective product, even though the
defect existed at the time they received the product, in which case the original cause of the
defect was some other party. In such a situation the wholesaler or retailer is not a cause-in-
fact of the defect, but is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury in two respects. First, but
for its sale of the product the injury would not have occurred. This aspect of retailer-wholesaler
causation of harm was recognized in the statement in Mead v. Warner Pruyn Div., Finch
Pruyn Sales, 87 Misc. 2d 782, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (1976) that the sale by the retailer
"was the final link in the chain which placed the defective product in position to inflict harm."
Second, but for the retailer's failure to discover the defect and remove the product from the
stream of commerce, the injury would not have occurred. This aspect of retailer-wholesaler
causation of harm is suggested by the statement in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1969) that "the retailer himself may
play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe."
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
9 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 1:41 (2d ed. 1974).
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of the product and to the expectations this representation creates in the
mind of a reasonable consumer.' 0 In many strict liability situations, the
representation rationale coincides with the other rationales in supporting
liability."'
In two situations, however, the representation rationale may support a
result different from that supported by the other rationales. First, represen-
tation of a product and the expectations of a reasonable consumer are im-
portant in determining whether a product is defective."' Some courts have
held that strict liability was not appropriate because the alleged defect was
so obvious or so inherent in the nature of the product that the product still
conformed to the manufacturer's representation or the expectations of a
reasonable consumer."' In these situations, the cost spreading, deterrence,
and causation rationales support liability. Second, the representation ra-
tionale is important in the strict liability of a trademark licensor. Several
cases have held that a trademark licensor is liable for injuries caused by
products manufactured by another party and sold under the trademark
name."4 In these cases representation was of the manufacturer's identity"0 '
1" See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function & Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1113,1370 (1974); Bernacchi, A Behavioral
Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance of Analyzing Product Performance
in Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 GIN. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1978). The
representation may be through advertising, the product's appearance, or general public
opinion concerning the product's function. Shapo, supra, at 1370.
101 For example, when a product causes injury while being used in the manner for which
it was intended, the representation rationale supports liability of the manufacturer because
it expressly or impliedly represented that the product was fit for such use. Liability of the
manufacturer is further supported by the cost spreading rationale because the manufacturer
is likely to be a better cost spreader than the consumer; the deterrence rationale supports
such liability because the manufacturer is in the best position to make cost-effective safety
improvements; and liability is supported by the causation rationale because the manufac-
turer played a significant role in causing the injury when it placed the defective product
in the stream of commerce.
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A comment g (1965) (product is defective
when it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him.").
"3 See, e.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1974) (danger of industrial
machine was obvious; not "beyond contemplation of an ordinary user"); Bemis Co. v. Rubush,
- Ind. App. -, 427 N.E2d 1058 (1981) (danger of industrial machine was obvious; manufac-
turer not liable for failure to warn of "open and obvious danger"); Atkins v. Arlans Dept.
Store, 522 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1974). (danger of lawn dart game did not exceed that "contemplated
by the ordinary consumer"); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (lack of self-latching gate on swimming pool is not a
defect under Wisconsin test based on "the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer").
'" E.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft and Sons, Co, 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Connelly
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979). In these cases liability was also sup-
ported by the deterrence rationale, as the licensor was in a position to pressure the manufac-
turer to improve product quality. The licensors in these cases were involved in prescribing
specifications and quality standards. 360 F. Supp. at 1107; see 75 Ill. 2d at 410-11, 389 N.E.2d
at 161.
105 In many cases the intent of the licensor and licensee is to convey the thought that the
licensor was the manufacturer. Even if this is not intended, a reasonable consumer would
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as well as the safety of the product. Although the other rationales provided
some support for licensor liability, the representation rationale provided
stronger support."'
The proper role of the representation rationale in strict liability doctrine
is presently an unsettled issue. The fact that some courts did not impose
liability in situations in which the product did not violate the manufacturer's
representation or the consumer's expectation suggests that the support
of the representation rationale is necessary to the imposition of strict liabil-
ity. On the other hand, there are cases which suggest the opposite
conclusion."°'
The Importance Which Should Be Attached to These Rationales in the Future
Development of the Law of Strict Products Liability
The cost spreading rationale should never be a sufficient justification
for expanding the scope of the doctrine of strict products liability to new
situations, such as the successor corporation situation. If cost spreading
is the only goal to be accomplished by holding a party liable in a given situa-
tion, this goal can be accomplished much more efficiently through a system
of social insurance, in which injured parties would be compensated out of
tax revenues."8 Under such a system, there would be no reason to limit
be likely to perceive it. The "licensor in effect tells the public that it made the product:'
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,703 (1980) (em-
phasis added). With this kind of involvement, it is clear that the licensor has influence over
the product quality.
": The involvement of the licensor discussed supra note 104 indicates that licensor liability
may have a deterrent effect, and that the licensor may have played a causal role in the plain-
tiff's injury. Nevertheless, depending on the nature of the defect, the licensee may be in a
much better position to make safety improvements, and may have played a significant causal
role. For example, with a defect caused by the negligence of a licensee employee, the deter-
rence and causation rationales provide stronger support for licensee liability than for licen-
sor liability; with a defect attributable to the licensor's design, these rationales provide
stronger support for licensor liability. A rule that allows licensor liability without regard
to the nature of the defect is therefore heavily influenced by the representation rationale,
which supports liability regardless of the nature of the defect.
107 E.g., Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) (that defect ig "open
and obvious" does not prevent it from being "unreasonably dangerous"; the manufacturer
may still be liable); Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978) ("there
are no policy reasons to refuse recovery if the condition is ... open and obvious"). For a criticism
of the cases denying liability because consumer expectations were not frustrated, see Twer-
ski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts,
60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 305-16 (1977).
..S Several commentators have recommended a form of social insurance as a solution to
the successor liability problem. E.g., Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A
Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 375 (1978; Note,Assumption ofProducts Liabil-
ity in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 86, 110 (1975). It has also been proposed as a
backup system for products liability generally, compensating victims who "cannot collect
an otherwise enforceable judgment," VII INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 24-33 (1977),
and discussed as a substitute for strict products liability generally, Schwartz, Products
Liability-No-Fault Insurance: Can One Live Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 130 (1976-1977).
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compensation to product-related accident victims; rather victims of all ac-
cidents and illnesses should be compensated, thereby spreading these costs
throughout society."9 Such a comprehensive system of cost spreading is
probably not politically feasible in the United States today. Without suffi-
cient public support for legislation that designates cost spreading as an
end in itself, cost spreading should not serve as the sole support for judicial
decisions that impose liability.
Another reason why cost spreading alone should not justify the expan-
sion of strict liability to new situations is that there is an inherent conflict
between the goals of cost spreading and deterrence."' If cost spreading
were maximized, there would be no direct financial deterrent to the pro-
duction of unsafe products. Under a system of social insurance that max-
imizes cost spreading, the manufacturer's payment into the system would
be totally independent of the accident costs imposed on society by his pro-
duct. Because there would be no direct financial penalty to the manufac-
turer for the production of unsafe products,' cost spreading would be max-
imized at the expense of deterrence.
Existing strict liability doctrine strikes a balance between these two con-
flicting goals."2 This balance should be maintained in the future develop-
"9 See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 43 (1975) (referring to cost spreading as
"secondary cost avoidance"). The case for such a comprehensive social insurance program
has recently been made in depth in E. BERNZWEIG, BY ACCIDENT NOT DESIGN: THE CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE INJURY REPARATIONS (1980). Such an approach to cost spreading is not merely
an academic possibility, but is a workable alternative to the tort system. New Zealand has
had a successful comprehensive accident compensation system since 1974. See id. at 191-209.
Under this system, "when accidental injury is sustained, compensation is payable regardless
of how or where the accident may have happened or who may have been at fault." Id. at 191.
Social insurance would more efficiently accomplish cost spreading for several reasons. First,
it would vastly simplify the factual and legal inquiry prior to compensation by eliminating
the need to establish the liability of a particular defendant. The only factual and legal issues
to be determined would be those concerning damages: whether the plaintiff was in fact in-
jured in an accident, how serious his injuries were, and how much compensation he was en-
titled to. Second, all injured plaintiffs would be compensated and thereby have their acci-
dent costs spread, whereas under the tort system there are many fortuitous circumstances
which can prevent injured plaintiffs from being compensated. That the corporation which
manufactured the product that injured the plaintiff has sold its assets and dissolved is but
one of such circumstances. Others include proof problems such as the inability to prove that
a product defect existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer, recovery
problems such as the inability of an uninsured defendant to pay a large judgment, and legal
doctrines unrelated to the goal of cost spreading, such as contributory or comparative
negligence. Third, social insurance would more efficiently accomplish cost spreading because
it would ensure that the cost of all compensated injuries would be spread evenly throughout
society, whereas under the tort system liability is placed on defendants with varying abilities
to spread cost. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
"'See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 94 (1975).
", See id. at 64-65. This does not mean there would be no incentives of any kind, as manufac-
turers would still want to avoid developing a reputation for producing unsafe products.
"I See supra note 85 for some situations in which deterrence prevents the placing of liability
on the manufacturer, who is usually the best cost spreader. A compromise in the other direc-
tion is that liability insurance is allowed. This is justified by cost spreading, but reduces the
deterrent effect of liability by reducing its financial impact on the defendant. See ATIYAH,
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION & THE LAw 604 (3d ed. 1980).
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ment of strict liability doctrine, and cost spreading alone should never
justify the expansion of strict liability to new situations, because "[a] system
that compensates for accidents perfectly once they have occurred but does
nothing to prevent them in the first place is obviously not desirable." ' Thus,
the support of the deterrence rationale should continue to be necessary
to the imposition of strict liability, and the support of the cost spreading
rationale should never be a sufficient basis for the imposition of strict
liability.
One function of the causation rationale is that it serves as a rough but
usually reliable indicator as to who should be held liable for the purpose
of deterrence." If successor liability is supported by the deterrence ra-
tionale, although not by the causation rationale, and if the only function
of the causation rationale is this proxy relation to the deterrence rationale,
then one might conclude that the causation rationale is a mere vestige of
fault liability that should not be allowed to interfere with the real policies
of strict liability. This argument for rejecting the causation rationale is
bolstered by the fact that liability is usually shifted or spread so that the
ultimate burden falls on noncausal parties.' Since the shifting or spreading
occurs indirectly even when liability is supported by the causation rationale,
perhaps courts should no longer rely on the support of the causation
rationale.
One argument for retaining the causation rationale, even when it does
not further deterrence, is that liability of a party who played no causal role
in the injury violates a moral and intuitive sense of justice and fairness."6
Although tort liability is not ordinarily thought to serve a retributive or
"3 G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 64 (1975). Arguably, the prevention of product-
related accidents need not be achieved through strict liability, but could be achieved en-
tirely through direct government regulation of product design and safety. Under such a
system, strict liability justified solely by cost spreading would be acceptable, although social
insurance would still be preferable as a means of cost spreading. The problem with this
argument is that strict liability is preferable to direct regulation as a means of deterrence.
Strict liability forces businesses to consider the social costs imposed by their products
in making product design and production decisions, but the ultimate decisions remain in
the private sector; with direct regulation the decisions are made by government agencies.
Strict liability has the advantage of encouraging only cost-effective safety improvements,
see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; with direct regulation a government agency
not operating under the profit motive might be inclined to require inefficient safety im-
provements, which cost far more than the costs of injuries they save.
"4 A party who played a causal role in an accident is usually in a position to respond to
the incentive created by liability by taking some safety measure to reduce or eliminate his
causal role. Causation is only a rough indicator for deterrence, however, for it provides no
guidance in choosing from all the causally involved parties the party able to take safety
measures most cost effectively. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
" Through insurance and/or price increases, manufacturers spread the cost of liability
to other insured manufacturers, and/or shift it to consumers.
"I8 See Case Note: Corporation-Successor's Tort Liability for Acts or Omissions of
Predecessor-Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 16 B.C. INDUS. & Cons. L. REv. 676,687 (1975); cf. Leannais
v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (traditional rule is consistent "with the
fundamental principle of justice and fairness, under which the law imposes responsibility
for one's own act and not for the totally independent acts of others.").
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punitive function, it can have that effect, especially when it involves huge
liabilities that are not adequately covered by insurance. It thus seems un-
fair to impose liability on a party that does not even remotely "deserve"
it, such as a party that played no causal role in the injury. When the liability
is spread, and thereby indirectly placed on noncausal parties, this fairness
concern is much weaker. Spreading liability is more like paying a tax than
like paying a fine: everyone else has to do it also. On the other hand, liability
placed directly on a noncausal party is more like a fine.
The causation rationale is consistent with basic notions of justice. Also,
until recent cases concerning successor and industry-wide liability, causa-
tion was the one element of tort law that was retained in the transition
to strict liability."' Considering the significance of the change involved in
eliminating the causation rationale, it is surprising how easily some courts
have expanded successor liability without addressing this issue. Considera-
tions of justice and fairness should be taken as seriously as the more
utilitarian economic policy considerations." 8 Support of the causation ra-
tionale should be retained as a necessary element of strict liability, and
rules of successor and enterprise liability not consistent with it should be
rejected.
The view represented by the cases that allow recovery without the sup-
port of the representation rationale... is quite persuasive. If the violation
of a representation or consumer expectation of a product is treated as a
necessary condition for liability, the deterrence policy, as well as the
cost spreading policy, is weakened because while no representation or ex-
pectation is violated when an injury is caused by an obviously dangerous
product, the manufacturer may nevertheless be the party who can most
efficiently implement cost-effective safety measures. Thus, it is arguable
that the support of the representation rationale should not be necessary
to the imposition of strict liability. 2' On the other hand, because of the im-
portance of the deterrence and causation rationales,12' support of the
representation rationale alone should not be a sufficient basis for the im-
position of strict liability.
" See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
118 Several writers have recognized that such considerations of fairness must be viewed
taking into consideration economic theory and other more utilitarian concerns. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 151,151-52 (1973 G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS, 25 (1975) ("justice is a totally different order of goal from accident cost reduction.
... It is not a goal but rather a constraint that can impose a veto on ... the use of particular
devices").
'" See supra note 107.
' See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liabil-
ity Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 305-16 (1977).
... See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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USING THE STRICT LIABILITY POLICY RATIONALES TO
EVALUATE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY PROBLEM
Expansion of the Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions to the
Traditional Corporate Rule of Successor Nonliability
The traditional version of the mere continuation exception to the tradi-
tional rule1" is consistent with the causation rationale. When a court deter-
mines that a successor corporation is a mere continuation of its predecessor,
it is looking beyond corporate form and finding that the successor is in fact
the same business entity as the predecessor and should be treated as such.
When a successor is held responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor
under the mere continuation exception, it is held liable not for the acts of
another entity but for its own acts during a previous corporate "life." The
de facto merger exception to the traditional rule involves liability for acts
of a predecessor corporate entity that has been absorbed into and has
become a part of the successor, with the stockholders of the predecessor
becoming stockholders of the successor." Because of this commonality of
ownership, under the de facto merger exception, as under the mere con-
tinuation exception, the successor and the predecessor are not wholly
distinct and unrelated entities. Successor liability is therefore not liability
for the unrelated acts of others." Liability under these two exceptions is
consistent with a broad interpretation of the causation rationale because
the party held liable, or a part thereof, did play a role in causing the plain-
tiff's injury.
Courts which have expanded the de facto merger and mere continuation
exceptions have done so by eliminating the requirement of commonality
of ownership.1" This change severs the relationship between the exceptions
and the causation rationale, because it makes little sense to treat two cor-
porations with entirely different ownership as entirely or partially the same
entity. Once the two corporations are viewed as entirely distinct entities,
12 See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 569, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970) for
a statement of the traditional mere continuation exception.
' See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
w Continuity of shareholders is probably the most important element of the de facto merger
exception. The justification for this exception is that
[t]he shareholders are the ones who ultimately enjoy the profits and suffer the
losses of the corporation, and the shareholders of one corporation should not
be able to move as a group to another corporation, enjoy the continuing profits
of the same business the corporation performed before merger, but escape all
possible losses that accumulated before merger.
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1148, 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1110
(1982).
I' E.g., Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 879-80 (1976);
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974).
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successor liability under the expanded mere continuation and de facto
merger exceptions is liability for the unrelated acts of a separate entity.
In no sense did the successor play a role in the causation of the plaintiffs
injury.
The deterrence rationale also provides more support for the traditional
versions of the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions than for
expanded versions of these exceptions. The deterrence rationale's support
for the mere continuation exception derives from the principle that a cor-
porate entity should not be able to avoid the deterrent effect of strict lia-
bility merely by manipulation and alteration of the corporate form.
Similarly, the de facto merger exception is supported by the deterrence
rationale because such an exception is based on the principle that a cor-
porate entity should not be able to avoid the legal consequences of a
statutory merger merely by cleverly planning the merger so as to achieve
all the results of a merger without coming within the scope of the merger
statute. Included in these legal consequences is the continuing deterrent
effect of the predecessor's tort liabilities that the merger statute requires
the successor to assume. Because they eliminate the commonality of owner-
ship, the expanded versions of these exceptions impose liability on suc-
cessors in situations that do not resemble a statutory merger or a mere
manipulation of corporate form, such as a change of name or state of incor-
poration. Rather, when the ownership is entirely different, the situation
is a genuine sale of assets between two separate corporations.
Thus, the causation and deterrence rationales support the mere continua-
tion and de facto merger exceptions as originally developed, but do not sup-
port expanded versions of these exceptions, such as those in Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co."" and Cyr v. B. Offen & Co." Although the cost
spreading rationale supports these expanded exceptions, because strict
liability should continue to be supported by both the causation and deter-
rence rationales,'28 these expanded exceptions should not be adopted.
The Product-Line Rule
The product-line rule of Ray v. Alad Corp." involves liability without
causation. This rule imposes liability on successor corporations that neither
manufactured the product nor contributed in any way to the creation of
the defect, to the distribution of the product, or to the plaintiffs injury.
Successor liability under this broad rule is liability "for the totally indepen-
397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
' See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
1 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3,136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). See supra notes 22-23 and accompany-
ing text for a description of the Alad rule.
[Vol. 58:677
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
dent acts of others."1 Thus the causation rationale does not support the
product-line rule.
The deterrence rationale provides little support for the product-line rule.
Holding the successor liable for the predecessor's products cannot improve
the quality of those products, as they have already been manufactured and
distributed.131 Successor liability under the product-line rule can have only
a minor deterrent effect on the successor's products, despite the fact that
when the successor continues the product line he "is the only entity capable
of improving the quality of the product." '32 Even without liability the suc-
cessor has as much incentive to improve the product as any other manufac-
turer because it knows it will be liable for the injuries caused by the pro-
ducts it manufactures. Imposing liability for a predecessor's products does
nothing to increase the successor's incentive to produce safe products,
because improvements in its products cannot reduce the successor's liability
for the predecessor's products. Successor liability can influence the safety
of the successor's products only by informing it of the existence of defects
in the predecessor's products and of the costs of the injuries they cause.
Where the successor continues the product line of the predecessor, this
information may enable the successor to respond more effectively to the
existing incentive, which is liability for its own products. The extent to
which successor liability is needed in order to convey this information is
questionable, since the successor already has an incentive to seek out such
information because of liability for its own products." This possible deter-
rent effect on the successor's products would only occur under the product-
line rule, and could not justify a successor liability rule like that in Turner
v. Bituminous Casualty Co."5 in which there is no product line continuity,
because information concerning defects in the predecessor's products is rele-
vant only to improvement of the successor's products where the successor
continues the predecessor's product line.
' Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977).
Ill While it is true that successor liability may give the successor an incentive to warn
owners of the predecessor's products of a known defect, thereby reducing the costs of ac-
cidents from the predecessor's products, the product-line rule is inapproriate for this pur-
pose. Such a rule is too broad, in that it imposes liability even in situations where a warning
would not be possible; yet it is too narrow, in that successors who do not continue the pro-
duct line might also be able to give warnings, but are not held liable. A more appropriate
rule for this aspect of deterrence is discussed infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
Il Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974).
Il It is worthwhile for the successor to obtain information concerning the past safety record
of the product line whenever this cost is less than the successor's estimate of the liabilities
it might help him avoid by helping him to improve the product. On the other hand, successor
liability might bring to the successor's attention some injuries caused by the predecessor's
products occurring after the acquisition. These injuries might otherwise go unnoticed because
the victims would go silently uncompensated instead of informing the successor of their oc-
currence by means of a lawsuit. Such information might well be too difficult and expensive
for the successor to obtain otherwise.
134 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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The representation rationale provides some support for the product-line
rule to the extent that the successor, by continuing the product line, im-
plies that it is the same entity as the predecessor." Otherwise the represen-
tation rationale does not support the product-line rule, because the suc-
cessor made no representation concerning the quality of the predecessor's
products.
Because it is not supported by the causation rationale, the product-line
rule involves a major departure from existing tort law and strict liability
principles. Support of the causation rationale should continue to be
necessary for the imposition of strict liability.13 The product-line rule,
therefore, should not be adopted. Even if a different view of the impor-
tance of the causation rationale is taken, the deterrence rationale provides
only weak and indirect support for the product-line rule. Consequently, the
rule should probably still be rejected. Finally, since the support of the cost
spreading and representation rationales alone should not be sufficient for
the imposition of strict liability, '37 the support of these rationales should
not be sufficient to justify the product-line rule.
Intermediate Successor Liability
In several cases'38 strict liability has been imposed upon corporations
which bought a predecessor corporation's assets subsequent to that cor-
poration's manufacture of the product that caused the plaintiff's injury, but
sold the assets to a third corporation prior to the time of litigation. As under
the product-line rule, liability of these "intermediate successor" corpora-
tions is not supported by the causation rationale.139 Unlike the product-line
rule, however, intermediate successor liability is not supported at all by
the deterrence rationale. Even if the product line is being continued by
the subsequent purchaser of the assets, liability of the intermediate suc-
cessor for the predecessor's products cannot possibly influence the quality
of the products being manufactured by this purchaser. Although such liabil-
ity might inform the intermediate successor of defects in the product line,
it is no longer in a position to use this information to improve the product
line. And because the cost-spreading rationale alone should not be a suffi-
cient justification for imposing strict liability, 4' intermediate successor
liability should not be imposed.
"' See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 108-13.
iI Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman
Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981). The Nieves case is summarized supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
"o See supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
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Successor Liability When Predecessor is Still Available as a Defendant
In most successor liability cases the predecessor corporation was not
available as a defendant, having been dissolved prior to the time of
litigation.' In the recent case of Tiff v. Forage King Industries,14 however,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin imposed liability on a successor corpora-
tion under a greatly expanded mere continuation exception despite the fact
that the predecessor that manufactured the defective product, a sole pro-
prietor, was alive and available as a defendant."'
Strict liability policies do not justify successor liability in the Tift
situation.44 Liability of the successor corporation is supported by a weak
and indirect deterrent effect on the successor's products, which could oc-
cur only if the successor continues the predecessor's product line.' Also,
such successor liability is strongly supported by the cost spreading and
representation rationales. These two rationales alone, however, should not
be sufficient to justify strict liability.'"
Strict liability policies, however, do support liability of the predecessor
that manufactured the defective product, whenever that party is available
as a defendant. The causation rationale supports the predecessor's liabili-
ty because the product would have been defective when it left the control
of the manufacturer. 4 The original deterrent purpose of strict liability,
to hold manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their own products to
provide incentives for the production of safer products, also supports
liability of a predecessor who is available as a defendant. Finally, fairness
dictates that a predecessor should not be permitted to escape liability for
its own defective products merely by selling its business name.
Liability Based on a Representation of Enterprise Continuity
Several cases suggest that successor liability could be based on the suc-
cessor's representation of enterprise continuity."4 Under this theory, a suc-
,41 E.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 660 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). The Alad
court specifically mentioned this as one of the reasons for successor liability. See supra text
accompanying note 23.
108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
"3 A similar situation may arise where the predecessor is a corporation that sells only
part of its assets to the successor and then continues as a viable operating corporation. See
Amader v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa., July 26, 1982).
14 See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
's See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 108-13 & 119-21.
" See Tift, 108 Wis. 2d at 77,322 N.W. 2d at 16 (allegedly defective product was manufac-
tured by predecessor, the sole proprietorship).
"' This theory was explicitly stated in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,
426, 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (1976). It is referred to less explicitly in some other cases whiclh
emphasize the benefits to the successor from exploiting the goodwill of the predecessor by
appearing to be the same enterprise. E.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 34, 560 P.2d 3,
10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 582 (1977); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.. 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974).
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cessor would be liable for injuries caused by its predecessor's products if
it represents to the public that it is the same business enterprise as the
predecessor. Although this theory substantially overlaps with the product-
line rule, it may lead to a different result in a situation in which the suc-
cessor does not continue the product line, but uses the predecessor's name
or trademark, thereby representing the enterprise's continuity.' This
representational theory is analogous to the trademark licensor cases
discussed above1 50 in that it involves a representation of manufacturer cor-
porate identity rather than of product quality, but it is distinguishable in
two ways. First, in the trademark cases liability was supported by the deter-
rence rationale,' 5 whereas successor liability based solely on this represen-
tational theory is not supported by the deterrence rationale.'52 Second, in
those cases it was reasonable to assume that buyers had relied to some
extent on the trademark in deciding to buy the product. In successor liability
cases, however, the representation of the successor's identity with the
predecessor occurs after the sale has been made by the predecessor. Con-
sequently, the buyer could not have relied upon this representation in
deciding to buy the product.1' Reliance is important because it ties the plain-
tiffs injury to the actions of the successor, so that liability is supported
by the causation rationale." Without such reliance, liability is not supported
by the causation rationale. Therefore, successor liability based solely on
this representational theory can only be supported by the cost spreading
and representation rationales. Because these rationales alone should not
be sufficient support for the imposition of strict liability," this theory should
be rejected.
Liability Under a Bona Fide Purchaser Rule
One reason successor liability might be necessary to achieve deterrence
is that otherwise corporate acquisitions could be used to avoid a corpora-
tion's known strict liability problems. The seller would get a "windfall" in
"9 Compare Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1980) (fundamental require-
ment for successor liability is exploitation of predecessor's goodwill, not continuation of the
precise product line) with Savini v. Kent Mach. Works, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(use of predecessor's trademark and goodwill is not sufficient basis for successor liability
when there is no product line continuity); Cody v. Sheboygan Mach. Co., __ Wis. 2d _,
321 N.W.2d 142 (1982) (use of predecessor's name and place of business not sufficient basis
for successor liability when there is no product line continuity).
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 104 & 106.
1 This is for the reasons stated supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
1 See Note, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-
Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338 (1979).
" If the plaintiff relied on the representation in deciding to buy the product, then the
representation was a cause of the plaintiffs injury. Without the representation the plaintiff
might not have bought the product, thereby avoiding the injury.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 108-13 & 119-21.
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the form of a higher price than the true worth of the business and the cor-
porate buyer would get a fresh start without liability, just as if it were
introducing a new product." This would undermine the policy of deterrence
by facilitating the avoidance of liability. To the extent this is the reason
for the product-line rule, a different rule of successor liability, which would
not discourage acquisitions, should be adopted."7 This rule would provide
for successor liability subject to a bona fide purchaser exception, limiting
successor liability to acquisitions in which the successor knew or should
have known of liability problems." Liability would be limited to injuries
caused by the defects that were known or should have been known. This
approach would require less of a departure from the causation rationale
than other successor liability rules because although the successor did not
cause the defect, by participating in the transaction it knowingly or
negligently contributed causally to the plaintiffs inability to recover from
the predecessor. Thus, this rule would tie liability to some wrongful con-
duct of the successor and would deter this conduct. This rule of successor
liability subject to a bona fide purchaser exception is supported by the
policies of strict liability, including the causation and deterrence rationales,
as well as by the policies underlying the traditional rule of nonliability."9
Liability Under a Duty to Warn Rule
A number of courts have stated in dictum that under certain conditions
a successor would be held liable for injuries caused by the predecessor's
products when the successor failed to warn owners of those products of
known defects, and those defects caused the injuries."'0 These courts have
indicated that they would follow the traditional tort law approach to
nonfeasance liability, imposing liability for a failure to act only if there is
a duty to act.6 ' Also, no duty of a successor to warn owners of the
predecessor's products would exist solely because of the successor's
knowledge of a defect and of the location of the product. These courts have
suggested that more of a relationship between the successor and the pro-
duct's owner is required before the successor would have a duty to warn,
' See supra note 23.
's See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
ISO For more detail on the proposed rule, see supra note 69.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
' E.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d
458 (1976).
"I1 There is usually only a duty to act where the defendant has a special relation to the
plaintiff of "actual or potential economic advantage to the defendant:' W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 339 (4th ed. 1971). This relation must be such that the defendant
"has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely, as distinguished from merely
failing to confer a benefit upon him." Id. at 340.
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such as service of the product or at least coverage of the product under
a service contract. 1
62
The imposition of a duty to warn on the successor is an alternative ap-
proach to successor liability that is consistent with the causation rationale.
The successor's failure to warn would contribute causally to a plaintiffs
injury in that the injury probably would not have occurred had a warning
been given. Unlike many of the broader rules of successor liability discussed
above, liability under the duty to warn rule, is based on something within
the control of the successor.163 If it knows of a defect or the likelihood of
a defect, does not warn of the defect, and is then held liable, the successor
is not held liable for the independent acts of others, but for failure to make
its own conduct conform to a legal standard. A stricter duty to warn rule
than that suggested above'64 would still have this advantage over the
product-line rule or an expanded continuity rule, even if it extended beyond
the traditional limitation on nonfeasance liability."5
A strict duty to warn rule is also supported by the deterrence rationale.
A successor that knows of a defect or the likelihood of a defect is the party
most likely to be able to reduce the costs of accidents cost effectively by
warning the product owners. Thus, successor liability for failure to warn
will contribute to the goal of the deterrence rationale."6 Expansion of suc-
cessor liability through a strict duty to warn rule is therefore desirable
because it is supported by the causation and deterrence rationales, as well
as by the cost-spreading rationale.67
CONCLUSION
Recent cases indicate that courts are expanding the scope of liability of
successor corporations for defective products manufactured by corporate
162 E.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,449 (7th Cir. 1977). But cf. Pelc v. Bendix Mach.
Tool Corp. 111 Mich. App. 343, 358, 314 N.W.2d 614, 621 (1981) (duty to warn if successor
is given some control of product or if successor becomes aware of a defect).
16 Under the expanded mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions, and the product-
line rule, successor liability is based on the predecessor's actions in producing a defective
product, something not within the control of the successor. See supra notes 126 & 130 and
accompanying text.
' See supra text accompanying notes 160-62.
165 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. A stricter duty to warn rule would impose
a duty to warn on a successor simply on the basis of knowledge of a defect or the likelihood
of a defect in the predecessor's products, without requiring any special relationship between
the successor and the owner of the product. The successor would be required to use all
reasonable methods to locate the product owners and communicate the warning to them.
16 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
167 This rule probably would compensate fewer plaintiffs than expanded mere continua-
tion and de facto merger exceptions, the product-line rule, or the enterprise continuity
representation rule, because there would be many situations where the successor would not
have a duty to warn because it would not know of any defects or likely defects. This rule
therefore serves the cost-spreading function less effectively, because it balances the cost-
spreading rationale against the causation and deterrence rationales.
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predecessors. This trend is exemplified by the fact that courts are finding
liability in new factual situations by using approaches that go beyond the
original exceptions to the traditional rule of nonliability. In expanding the
scope of successor liability, however, no court has considered the policies
underlying the traditional rule to ascertain their ultimate effect on the ap-
plication of this rule to strict liability claims. Three policies, based on con-
tract law, tort law, and economically desirable commercial transactions,
all support a successor's nonliability in products liability claims.
Four rationales which support strict products liability combine to allow
findings of successor liability under the original exceptions to the tradi-
tional rule. Two rationales crucial to strict liability, causation and deter-
rence, however, support expanded versions of successor liability only in
two instances: when there exists a strict duty to warn and when successors
have actual or constructive notice of defects in a predecessor's products
at the time of the acquisition. Also, policies underlying the traditional rule
tend to support liability in the latter situation, which is analogous to a bona
fide purchaser doctrine. Consequently, courts that desire to expand the
liability of successor corporations should first give appropriate considera-
tion to policies underlying the traditional rule and to strict products liability
rationales.
GEORGE L. LENARD
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